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Abstract
We consider a setting where rms need to make irreversible investments to exploit
a countrys comparative advantage. Firms are then susceptible to ex-post rent extrac-
tion by a transit country or by other agents that are able to limit access to world
markets. We develop a general equilibrium model where this potential holdup prob-
lem makes such countries poorer and less likely to invest in technology that generates
their comparative advantage. The predictions of the model are examined using gravity
equations and a new measure of distances that explicitly considers the location of the
closest ports. The evidence is consistent with less trade by landlocked countries as a
result of the holdup problem we examine.
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The commerce besides which any nation can carry on by means of a river
which does not break itself into any great number of branches or canals, and
which runs into another territory before it reaches the sea, can never be very
considerable; because it is always in the power of the nations who possess that
other territory to obstruct the communication between the upper country and the
sea. The navigation of the Danube is of very little use to the di¤erent states of
Bavaria, Austria and Hungary, in comparison of what it would be if any of them
possessed the whole of its course till it falls into the Black Sea.
Adam Smith (1776), [1979, p125-126].
1 Introduction
Countries can achieve large e¢ ciency gains by specializing according to comparative advan-
tage. However, fears that opening an economy to trade and foreign investors will put foreign
powers in a position to extract rents are central to many policy debates. We know that
factors that a¤ect the splitting of the surplus generated by trade between two rms can have
important consequences for how to organize production (see for instance Coase (1937) or
Grossman and Hart (1986) - Lafontaine and Slade (2007) survey the empirical evidence).
Thus, it seems hard to dismiss the arguments about distribution of gains from trade between
countries out of hand.
In the present paper we write down a general equilibrium model that allow us to examine
the e¤ects of trade liberalization in a setting where asymmetric bargaining positions a¤ect
the distribution of the gains from trade. A key feature of our model is that an investment
is needed in a rst stage to develop a comparative advantage in a second stage. Countries
whose most direct route to the world market passes through a transit country (or another
type of hub) are vulnerable rent extraction by the party who controls the trade route. This
has an impact on both trade volume and incentives to develop a comparative advantage. The
2
perhaps starkest example where such setting is relevant is trade by landlocked countries. Less
starkly we could think of cases where a country is dependent on an intermediary to reach
world markets: This could be a monopsonistic buyer of the main product that a country
would export if it specialized according to comparative advantage (think of a 1920s central
American country contemplating specializing in banana growing with United Fruit as the
main buyer) or a shipping cartel that controls trade routes to a small country (see Hummels,
Lugovskyy and Skiba (2009) for an analysis of market power in international shipping).
From existing literature we know that landlocked countries trade less and face higher
transport costs than coastal nations: A dummy for landlocked is associated with a negative
e¤ect on bilateral trade in gravity equations, see for instance Frankel and Romer (1999) or
Rose (2004). For evidence of higher trade costs faced by landlocked countries see Limão
and Venables (2001) or Raballand, Kunth and Auty (2005). Recent micro evidence on the
trade costs facing landlocked countries however points to that longer overland distances per
se are not the main reason for higher trade costs. For instance a report by the World Bank
establishes that (Arvis, Raballand and Marteua (2007), p. 1)
"The main sources of costs [for landlocked economies] are not only physical constraints
but widespread rent activities and severe aws in the implementation of the transit systems".
As an example of waste due to a holdup problem between countries Collier and Venables
(2008) point to Guineas insistence that iron ore from a new Rio Tinto mine be exported via
a new domestic railway line, rather than via an existing railway line that ends in neighboring
Liberia.
This suggests that the holdup problem that Adam Smith pointed to in the "Wealth of
Nations" is relevant also today and we use our model to characterize how investments, wel-
fare and trade regime depend on the costs of investing in technology and on the possibility
for a country to block access to world markets. We rst introduce a model with the country
of interest and a rest of the world only. We then consider the case where the trade of the
country of interest has to pass through a transit country to reach world markets. To point out
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the wider applications, and stress the relation to the partial equilibrium holdup literature,
the landlocked country is referred to as Upstream and the transit country as Downstream.
We show that free trade increases income and the range of protable investments in Up-
stream. We also show conditions under which opening up for trade will induce investments
in Upstream, and that such an opening can be optimal even absent a commitment from
Downstream. We show that if the investment in technology leads to a large enough improve-
ment (equivalently, then investment cost is low enough), then it is optimal for Downstream
to charge fees that are intermediate and still allow Upstream to obtain positive gains from
trade. However, the volume traded, welfare in Upstream and the cost at which investment in
technology is worth undertaking are still lower. For smaller improvements in technology, the
holdup problem can be the reason why Upstream does not develop a comparative advantage.
Under some parameter values, there is also a potential commitment problem where Down-
stream would like to induce investment and trade, but has an incentive to ex-post renegotiate
these fees. In such case, Upstream may be better o¤ to commit to stay in autarky.
We extend the model to address the e¤ect of foreign ownership of rms in Upstream.
In our model foreign ownership serves to alleviate the holdup problem. If policy makers in
Downstream take into account the business interests of their residents, they make the trade
conditions more favorable for Upstream. This leads to an increase of technology investments
and wages in Upstream that arises purely from the more favorable trade conditions, and can
be benecial for both countries.
We proceed to examine the implications in a gravity model of bilateral imports using data
for 1950-2000. To avoid systematically assigning too low bilateral distances to landlocked
countries we replace the great circle distance ("as the crow ies") typically used in the gravity
literature with distances from main city to main city via the closest ports. Our results point
to that trading via a transit country reduces imports by more than 50 percent We examine
the role of free trade agreements with transit countries as well as foreign direct investment to
counterweigh the holdup problem. For free trade agreements there is a borderline signicant
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positive e¤ect while, consistent with the predictions of the model, there is evidence that
foreign ownership is associated with a weakening of the holdup e¤ect.
As indicated by the quote from the Wealth of Nations we are not the rst to recognize
the potential for holdup facing landlocked countries - but to the best of our knowledge it
has not been modeled previously.1 The closest precursor is McLaren (1997) who examines a
two-country Ricardian model with the only non-standard feature that rms in a rst period
choose which industry to be present in and then in period 2 trade. He shows that a small
country may have higher welfare in autarky than if it specializes according to comparative
advantage - since specialization makes the small country vulnerable to rent extraction from
the large country.2 The result is thus the opposite from a standard trade model, without
the sectorial lock in of investments, where a small country will gain from unilateral trade
liberalization (see for instance Bagwell and Staiger (1999)). Compared to McLaren (1997)
we consider imperfect competition, rather than price taking behavior by all rms, and focus
on a di¤erent trade friction - the bargaining power of a transit country. Also, modelling
the investment decision, rather than having rms choosing their industry as in McLaren
(1997), allows us to examine the interplay between investments and trade policy without
forcing countries to maintain a sub-optimal industry specialization. Furthermore, there are
additional novel predictions in our paper regarding the e¤ect of foreign ownership of rms
on the value of rms, investments and welfare through the e¤ect of ownership of rms on
optimal trade policy.
A setting with relation specic investment has been applied to international trade in
for instance Antràs and Helpman (2004) and Grossman and Helpman (2005), see Helpman
(2006) for a survey. Recent related work by Ornelas and Turner (2011), Antràs and Staiger
1A non-model based precursor is Hirschman (1945) who examines how the Nazi regime in Germany used
trade policy to wield power. During the 1960s a set of ideas known as "dependency theory" became popular
as a framework to analyze in particular Latin American development. It built partly on the Prébish-Singer
notion that deteriorating terms of trade for primary products make developing countries loose out on trade
(see for instance Prébish 1959) and partly on Marxist analysis (see for instance Gunder Frank (1967)). As
will become apparent, our framework is very di¤erent.
2McLaren (2002) examines regionalism vs free trade in a similar setting with 3 equally sized countries -
investment decisions are made in period 1 and trade negotiations follow in period 2.
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(2012) and Conconi et. al. (2012) use two-country models to examine links between trade
policy and the organization of rms in a setting with relation-specic investments. Ornelas
and Turner for instance show that an import tari¤ may raise welfare by making foreign
inputs costlier and thus provide domestic suppliers of specialized inputs a stronger bargain-
ing position - which serves to alleviate a hold-up problem. These works do not explore the
potential for holdup at the country level that is our focus. By modelling the optimal tech-
nology investments the paper also relates to the endogenous growth literature (e.g. Romer
(1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992)). In particular, it relates to the literature that addresses
the relationship between trade and the evolution of technology (e.g. Grossman and Helpman
(1991), Acemoglu (2002)). Unlike the current paper, this literature mainly focuses on the
e¤ects of technology spillovers across countries, and does not address the interaction between
technology and optimal trade arrangements. Lastly we should also point to the papers that
analyze the equilibrium fees set by successive jurisdictions that traders need to pass - in these
papers the silk road linking ancient China and Rome is taken as the motivating example.
Karni and Chakrabarty (1997) show how the double marginalization problem associated with
each jurisdiction adding its fee raises price. Feinberg and Kamien (2001) establish that with
sequential trade the double marginalization problem may instead be replaced by a holdup
problem - anticipating the high fees the merchant may never set out from his home.3 Apart
from that we model the general equilibrium and resulting wages, investments and trade pat-
terns, a key di¤erence with respect to these latter papers is that we assume that the nal
destination for exports is a price taking "rest-of-the-world", rather than a sophisticated rent
extractor.
Section 2 sets up the model and Section 3 outlines main predictions from our model and
examines trade patterns in a gravity framework. We conclude in Section 4.
3Miyagiwa (2009) shows how a trigger strategy can sustain trade in a repeated game version of the
Feinberg and Kamien (2001) setting.
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Figure 1: Producers and production interactions in country c.
2 The model
We focus on a one period general equilibrium model of bilateral trade between a small
country c and the rest of of the world, indexed with w, in the presence of a potential
holdup problem. Figure 1 illustrates the interactions in the production side of country c.
We introduce several layers of production, as it allows to show in a transparent setting how
investment in technology can ultimately lead to specialization and potential gains from trade,
while keeping the model in the spirit of familiar settings. There is a nal composite good
that is assumed to be non-tradable. The nal good uses two specialized goods as inputs that
are tradable - goods A and F .
We assume that if country c does not invest in technology, then it is identical to the rest
of the world and naturally there are no incentives to trade. However, country c is assumed to
have access to a technology, which allows it to develop a comparative advantage in producing
one of the tradable goods - specialized good A. Modelling of technology investments is the
spirit of Aghion and Howitt (1992), and we assume that a xed investment in technology in
c leads to an improvement of the quality of capital goods used in sector A.
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In terms of modelling the trade incentives, our model is Ricardian. If country c invests in
technology, then the productivity of specialized good sector A increases relative to specialized
goods sector F . As the result, the A sector will be relatively better able to increase wages and
thus attract labor. This generates incentives of country c to trade with the rest of the world
by exporting good A and importing good F . Modelling the nal good as a composite good
produced from the two specialized goods is the easiest way to capture consumerspreferences
over these two goods.
After describing this benchmark model in Section 2.1, Section 2.2 addresses our main
question - the holdup problem. Namely, we argue that the trade between country c and the
rest of the world depends on the geographical location of the country c in question. The
country in question could have a direct access to the world market, or it would need to trade
through a transit country. In the latter case we refer to the country in question as Upstream
and the transit country as Downstream. Due to itslocation, Downstream has an opportunity
to charge fees for all the imports and exports that will pass through the country. We assume
that the objective of the government in Downstream is to maximize its own consumers
welfare and will distribute all the returns from fees to consumers in Downstream. We will
show how these fees reduce the trade volume between Upstream and the rest of the world if
the latter still chooses to invest. Fees also make it less likely that Upstream will develop a
comparative advantage to start with. Section 2.3 shows how the holdup problem is partially
alleviated if rms in Upstream are owned by agents in Downstream. The model allows us
to derive empirically testable implications and we will focus on the expression for import
volume.
In terms of timing, we assume that investment in technology is made up-front (at the
beginning of the period) and all other production and (potentially) trade occurs at the end
of the period. In the case that the country in question is Upstream, we assume that fees are
decided in the middle of the period, i.e., after the investment decision has been made and
before the rest of production and trade occurs.
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Finally, in the model we abstract from the physical trading cost to keep the model simpler
and because these costs are well understood in the literature. However, we take these costs
into account in our empirical specication.
2.1 Benchmark model
2.1.1 Setup
Production of specialized goods: All countries can produce two specialized goods: an
F -good whose quality is xed in all countries and an A-good whose quality is xed in the
rest of the world, but can be improved in the small country c. We denote these goods and
corresponding sectors with J 2 fA;Fg. We use similar notation to denote the quality of
specialized goods in country i 2 fc; wg as J i. As the quality of the F -good is xed, it holds
that F i = F for all i. The quality of the A-good in the rest of the world is xed as well and
without a loss of generality, we normalize it to Aw = 1: At the beginning of the period, rms
in country c have an opportunity to invest in improving the quality of A-good for a xed
investment I. All other production takes place at the end of the period and for country c
the quality of A-good is
Ac =
8><>:
A if rms in country c chose to invest in technology
1 if rms in country c chose not to invest in technology.
(1)
We specify the technology investment decision at the end of this section.
A specialized good J 2 fA;Fg in country i 2 fc; wg is produced by a competitive special-
ized goods sector who produces iJ units of the specialized with Cobb-Douglas production
technology
iJ =
 
liJL
iJ i
1 
xiJ

; (2)
where liJ is the share of labor force employed in by the producers of J-good, L
i is the total
labor force, J i 2 fF;Aig is the quality of technology, xiJ is the capital used in J sector and
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 = (0; 1) is a constant. Capital and labor are not mobile across countries and labor market
clearing implies that liA + l
i
F = 1. We normalize the labor force in country c to L
c = 1
and assume that the labor force in the rest of the world, Lw, is noticeably larger. This will
guarantee that the rest of the world is always incompletely specialized in equilibrium.4
Specialized goods producers in country i 2 fc; wg sector J 2 fA;Fg take the price of
specialized good piJ , wage w
i
J and price of capital p
i
x;J as given and
max
lij;t;x
i
j;t
piJ
i
J   wiJ liJLi   pix;JxiJ st. (2). (3)
Technology rms: In the spirit of growth literature (e.g., Aghion and Howitt (1992)), we
assume that sector specic capital goods are produced by a monopolistic technology rms in
each country. Without a loss on generality, we assume that both capital goods are produced
by the same monopoly, who takes into account the demand curve for capital goods xiA and
xiJ by the specialized goods sector and maximizes gross prots
max
xiA;x
i
F
i =
P
j=A;F
pix;Jx
i
J   xiJ st. demand curves derived from (3): (4)
As discussed above, the technology producer in country c can improve the quality of
capital goods in sector A by investing I. It is clear that investment in technology pays o¤ if
c( A;F )  c(1; F )  I: (5)
Final good production: We take the nal good as a numeraire and assume that a com-
petitive nal goods sector combines two specialized good in a nal (consumption) good with
4See Section 2.1.3 and Appendix B.4 for more details and the precise condition for Lw:
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the following Cobb-Douglas technology,5
Y i =
 
Y iA
  
Y iF
1 
; (6)
where Y iF and Y
i
A denote the quantity of specialized goods A and F used in country i 2 fc; wg
and  2 (0; 1) is a constant. Final goods sector solves
max
Y iA;Y
i
F
Y i   piAY iA   piFY iF st. (6), (7)
where piF and p
i
A are the prices of good A and F in country i 2 fc; wg.
Consumption: Consumers are endowed with labor and own rms in their country. In
our benchmark model we assume that all rms are owned by local consumers and therefore
average per-capita consumption6 is
Ci
Li
= wiAl
i
A + w
i
F l
i
F +
i   I i~1i
Li
, (8)
where wiAl
i
A +w
i
F l
i
F is the wage income; 
i   I  ~1i is net prots from owning the technology
rms, ~1i is an indicator function such that ~1i = 1 if country i invests in technology and
~1i = 0 otherwise. Note that ~1w = 0 as the rest of the world lacks the technology investment
opportunity. As a measure of utility, we consider any monotonically increasing function
of average per capita consumption. Consumers optimally use all their income to consume.
While they take the income from owning the rms as given, they choose where to supply
their labor.
5Similar results would be obtained for any nal good production function as long as A-good and F-good
are not perfect substitutes, results with a more general CES production function are available upon request.
6An alternative way to specify aggregate consumption is to note that the aggregate goods market condition
is Ci = Y i   Ii~1i   xiA   xiF as the nal good is used for consumption, and investments in techology and
capital.
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2.1.2 Optimal production decisions
Before considering autarky of free trade it is useful too derive some intermediate outcomes
regarding production decisions.
Lemma 1 Given the price of specialized good piJ and the share of labor l
i
J supplied to sector
J 2 fA;Fg in country i 2 fc; wg, the optimal quantity of good J produced, prots and wages
are respectively
iJ = 
2
1 Li
 
piJ
 
1  liJJ
i; (9)
i = (1  )   21 Li
 
piA
 1
1  liAA
i +
 
piF
 1
1  liFF

; (10)
wi = max

wiA; w
i
F

; where wiJ  
2
1  (1  )  piJ 11  J i (11)
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
The intuition of Lemma 1 is straightforward, in any country the production of a special-
ized good J 2 fA;Fg is higher if the price of that good is higher and the good is of higher
quality (i.e., J i is higher).
It also follows immediately from the rst order condition of the nal good sector problem
(7) that
piA
piF
=

1  
Y iF
Y iA
(12)
 
piA
  
piF
1 
=    (1  )1  (13)
2.1.3 Autarky and free trade in the benchmark model
Autarky: Final goods market clearing conditions for the autarky are
Y iA = 
i
A and Y
i
F = 
i
F for i 2 fc; wg (14)
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Lemma 2 In autarky, the specialized goods prices in the rest of the world are
pwA = F
(1 )(1 ) and pwF = F
 (1 ) (15)
and in the country c are
8><>: p
c
A = F
(1 )(1 ) and pcF = F
 (1 ) if ~1c = 0
pcA = 
 
F
A
(1 )(1 )
and pcF = 
 
F
A
 (1 )
if ~1c = 1:
(16)
The country c invests in technology if
I  Iaut, where Iaut      A   1 (17)
and consumption per capita in the rest of the world is
Cw_aut
Lw_aut
= C    (1 + ) (18)
and in the country c is
Cc_aut =
8><>:
C if ~1c = 0
C +  
 
A   1+ (Iaut   I) if ~1c = 1; (19)
where constant
   (1  ) 21 F (1 ) 11  : (20)
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
If investment in technology pays o¤, i.e. Iaut  I, then consumption in the country c is
higher than in the rest of the world.7 It is immediate that if country c does not invest in
7As in most of the endogenous growth models (e.g. Romer (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992), Grossman
and Helpmann (1991)) the aggregate benet of investment in technology is higher than the private benets
for the technology producing rms, i.e., even if Iaut = I, consumption in country c is higher in the than
in the case of no investments. This is because investments in technology lead to higher wages that are not
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technology, then there are no benets of trade between county c and the rest of the world
as two prices of specialized goods are the same. However, if country c does invest, then the
autarky price in country c is lower for good A and higher for good F . Therefore, in the case
of trade there are incentives for country c to export good A and import good F.
Free trade: In the case of free trade, the law of one price holds and pcJ = p
w
J for
J 2 fA;Fg. Furthermore, the current account must be balanced,
pA
 
Y iA   iA

+ pF
 
iF   Y iF

= 0, (21)
for i = fc; wg : If there are two countries then the worldwide goods market clearing condition
is cJ + 
w
J = Y
c
J + Y
w
J for J 2 fA;Fg.
We assumed that the rest of the world is large enough, such that the world is always
incompletely specialized.8 Therefore, it must hold that wwA = w
w
F , which from (11) and (13)
implies that world prices are given by the autarky prices in the rest of the world (15), i.e.,
pA = F
(1 )(1 ) and pF = F (1 ): (22)
Due to this all the outcomes in the rest of the world are the same in autarky and in free
trade.
It also follows that if country c invests in technology, i.e., ~1c = 1 and Ac = A, then
the wages in A-good sector are higher than in F-good sector and the country will be fully
specialized in A-good. Namely, in such case from (11) wcA > w
c
F , (pA)
1
1  A > (pF )
1
1  F
, F (1 ) A > F (1 ) , A > 1, and from (8), it is clear that it is optimal for consumers to
allocate all their labor endowment to the A-sector, i.e., lcA = 1.
reected in the prots of technology producers.
8Appendix B.4 prooves that if N  1 countries are fully specialized in good A, then the world is incom-
pletely specialized as long as Lw  N  1  A. While not crucial, we assume that this condition always holds
as it simplies the model.
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Lemma 3 In the case of free trade, country c invests in technology, ~1c = 1 if
I  Ifree_trade, where Ifree_trade      A  1 (23)
and consumption in the country c is
Cc_free_trade =
8><>:
C if ~1c = 0
C +  
 
A  1+  Ifree_trade   I if ~1c = 1: (24)
If country c invests in technology, then import by country c is
Y cF   cF = (1  )F (1 )
2
1  

1  A: (25)
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
Comparing Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 we can see that openness to trade makes it more likely
that the country c invests in technology, as Ifree_trade > Iaut ,     A  1 >     A   1
, A1  > 1. Also consumption in country c is likely to be higher, both because investment
in technology is more likely to be protable (as Ifree_trade I > Iaut I) and there are bigger
benets from better technology in terms of higher wages (as  
 
A  1 >     A   1).
As we will now focus on the potential holdup problem, it is worth noting that free trade
between a country and the rest of the worlds is likely to occur if either the country has a
direct route to transport its goods to the rest of the world, or it has a free trade agreement
with any countries that are on its route the world market.
2.2 Holdup problem
We maintain the setting as in Section 2.1 with the following modication. Assume that the
country in question, potentially trading with the rest of the world, does not have a direct
access to the world market and all its trade must pass through a third country. We call the
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country in question Upstream, c = u and the third country as Downstream. In addition
to any production that occurs in Downstream (and itstrade with the rest of the world),
Downstream has a opportunity to charge fees for imports and exports between Upstream
and the rest of the world. Given our results in the previous Section, it is clear that trade
between Upstream and the rest of the world can only be protable if Upstream develops a
comparative advantage in the A-good, in which case it would export good A and import good
F . We assume that due to the holdup problem, Downstream taxes the goods traded such that
provided the world prices of pA and pF , the prices that Upstream faces are puA = pA (1  A)
and puF = pF (1 + F ) respectively, where A; F  0.9 If Upstream is still willing to trade
under these conditions, then Downstream earns variable fee income of
T dv = pAA (
u
A   Y uA ) + pF F (Y uA   uA) : (26)
As we maintain the assumption that the rest of the world is large enough to remain incom-
pletely specialized, the world prices are given by the autarky prices in the rest of the world
given by (22).
We assume that the government in Downstream aims to maximize local consumers wel-
fare. We should note that it is not crucial to specify production in Downstream, as the fees
regarding the trade between Upstream and the rest of the world do not a¤ect production
decisions in Downstream in many relevant settings.10 Abstracting from trading incentives
between Upstream and Downstream is natural in this setting as any trade between these
9Another possibility is a xed fee, which is perhaps harder to implement for Downstream but can also lead
to additional rent extraction. We have solved the model also for that specication and results are available
upon request.
10For example, we could assume that Downstream has the same structure as the small country analyzed
in Section 2.1. The modication here would be that per capita consumption, Downstream, c = d (8) would
be given by Cd = wdAl
d
A + w
d
F l
d
F +
 
d   Id~1d + T d, where T d is a lump-sum transfer of the fee income
to itsconsumers. It is easy to verify that with large enough labor in the rest of the world, all production
decisions in Downstream are una¤ected (and both countries are two small to have a price impact in the
rest of the world). It can also be veried that in such settings it will never be the case that Upstream
specializes in A-good and Downstream does not, hence the countries lack incentives to directly trade with
each other. Maximizing welfare of consumers in Downstream is then equivalent to maximizing the fee
income. Alternatively, Downstream could have di¤erent preferences and specialize in trading di¤erent goods
than A and F with the rest of the world.
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two countries is not subject to a holdup problem.
The current account in Upstream is given by
puA (
u
A   Y uA ) + puF (Y uA   uA) = 0: (27)
2.2.1 Solution of the model with a holdup.
We should rst note that the relationship between the fees charged on imports and exports
by Upstream are interdependent. Having normalized the price of nal good to 1, the price
index (13) must hold in all countries and from world prices (22). Hence if Upstream trades,
it must hold that
(puA)
 (puF )
1  =  () 1 + F = (1  A)
  1 
(28)
and the prices in Upstream are given by 11
puA = (1  A) F (1 )(1 ) and puF = (1  A)
  1 
F (1 ). (29)
Notice that at the end of the period, Upstream has always an opportunity to not trade,
in which case its prices are the same as in autarky that we have solved for in Section 2.1.
For Upstream to have an incentive to trade, it must hold that Upstream still has an incentive
to specialize in A-good, i.e., it must hold that wuA  wuF .
Lemma 4 Upstream never trades for A > 0 if it does not invest in technology, ~1c = 0. If
Upstream invests in technology, i.e., ~1c = 1, then it is willing to trade as long as A  maxA ,
where
maxA = 1 
1
A(1 )(1 )
: (30)
11In reality, the Downstream country could choose the fees separately. However, if (28) would not hold
then there would be an adjustment of the Upstream countrys exchange rate. By considering all variables in
the units of nal good, we have taken such exchange rate adjustment already into account.
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Proof. Suppose that Upstream did not invest and wuA  wuF . Then from (11) and
(29) (puA)
1
1   (puF )
1
1  F () (1  A)
1
1  
1
1 F (1 )  (1  A)
  1  11 

1
1 F 1  ()
(1  A)
1
(1 )(1 )  1, which is a contradiction for any A > 0. Now suppose that Upstream
invests. Then from (11) and (29), we obtain that wuA  wuF if (puA)
1
1  A  (puF )
1
1  F ()
(1  A)
1
(1 )(1 ) A  1() 1  1A(1 )(1 )  A, which gives (30).
It is clear that the holdup problem is only relevant if Upstream invests in technology.
The condition (30) also sets an upper limit on the fees that can be charged by Downstream.
Any higher fees would imply that Upstream prefers autarky and Downstream does not earn
any fee income. The maximum fees are higher if the potential improvement of technology in
Upstream, A, is larger.
Before addressing the optimal fees by Downstream and the conditions under which Down-
stream chargers maximum fees, let us nd the main outcomes in Upstream if it chose to invest
in technology and 0 < A  maxA .
Proposition 5 Upstream invests in technology, ~1c = 1, if
I  Iu   

A (1  A)
1
1    1

: (31)
If it invests in technology then consumption in Upstream is given by
Cu = C +  

(1  A)
1
1  A  1

+ Iu   I; (32)
imports are
(Y uF   uF ) = (1  ) (1  A)
1
1 +

1  F (1 )
2
1  

1  A (33)
and exports are
(uA   Y uA ) = (1  ) (1  A)

1  F(1 )
2
1  

1  A: (34)
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Proof. Given luA = 1, the prot in the case of investment is from (10) and (29) given
by uA
 
A;F

= (1  )   21  A (1  A)
1
1  
1
1 F (1 ) =   A (1  A)
1
1  , while for the
case of no-investment it is uA
 
A;F

=  . From (29), (11), (10) in (8) we obtain that
Cu = (1 + )   (1  A)
1
1  A  I. Using then (18) and (31), we obtain (32). From (27) the
quantity imported is (Y uF   uF ) = Y uF = p
u
A
puF
(uA   Y uA ) =) puFY cF + puAY cA = puAuA. At the
same time we know that by (12) it also holds that puFY
c
F + p
u
AY
c
A =
1
1 Y
u
F pF . Therefore,
Y uF = (1  ) p
u
A
puF
uA. Using (29) and (9), we obtain that imports are (Y
u
F   uF ) = Y uF =
(1  ) puA
puF
uA = (1  )
2
1  

1 
(1  A)
1
1   1  F 1  A which gives (33). The value of
export follows from current account (uA   Y uA ) = p
u
F
puA
(Y uF   uF ) and prices (29).
Comparing Proposition 7 with Lemma 4, we can see that any positive fees charged by
Downstream will reduce the range of values of I at which it is optimal for Upstream to invest
in technology. Therefore, a potential holdup problem reduces the likelihood that Upstream
will develop a comparative advantage. If Upstream does invest, then both consumption and
imports are still lower than in the case of free trade. If fees are smaller than the maximum
fees, then the average consumer in Upstream is better o¤ in the case of trade than in the
case of autarky.
We can now explore the optimal fees. Assume that Upstream has invested in technology.
Downstream knows how the volume of exports and imports depends to A (see (33) and
(34)). Using also (22), (26) and (28), the optimal fees must solve
max
A
T dv =

(1  ) 21   11  AF (1 )

(1  A)

1 

1  (1  A)
1
1 

, s.t., A  maxA . (35)
Proposition 6 The optimal fee charged by Downstream is
 vA =
8><>: 

A = 1 

 
1 
1 
> 0 if  A  mA
maxA if 

A > 
m
A
(36)
Proof. As the rst term in (35) is a constant, the equivalent problem is max
A
ln
 
T dv

=
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1  ln (1  A) + ln

1  (1  A)
1
1 

. As ln
 
T dv

is concave A,12 we obtain that if the
constraint A  maxA is not binding, then the rst order condition gives that
@ ln(T dv )
@A
=
  
1 
1
1 A +
1
1 
1
(1 A)

(1  A) 
1
1    1
 1
= 0 () A =  A as given in (36). If  A > mA ,
then Downstream charges maximum fees such that Upstream is indi¤erent between autarky
and trading.
Proposition 6 implies that Downstream always charges positive fees. As long as the
optimal fee is not the maximum one, i.e.  vA  mA , it does not depend on the quality of
technology in Upstream. This is because better quality of technology proportionally increases
both exports and imports of Upstream. At the same time, from (35) it is clear that the fee
income for Downstream is higher if the technology is better. From (30) and (36)  A  mA
holds if and only if the quality of technology is su¢ ciently high, i.e. A >

1 
 
 1
(1 )
>
1. Together with Proposition 7, this implies that if there is large enough improvement in
technology, Upstream is strictly better o¤ trading than in autarky, but still less well o¤ than
in the absence of the holdup problem.
Finally, if the improvement in technology is relatively small, then the possibility of a
holdup problem can lead to a situation where Upstream and Downstream are both weakly
worse o¤ compared to free trade. Namely, if the cost of investments is such that Iu <
I < Ifree_trade, Upstream does not invest in technology and Downstream does not benet
from the fees. If such a situation arises Downstream would benet from committing to
lower fees through a trade agreement, such that Upstream still has a incentive to develop
a comparative advantage and trade. However, such commitment may not be possible as
Downstream would have an incentive to renegotiate the fees after Upstream has already
made the sunk investments. We now consider another mechanism that can partially mitigate
the holdup problem - ownership of rms in Upstream by the investors in Downstream.
12 @
2 ln(Tdv )
@2A
=   1  1(1 A)2  
1
1 


1  (1  A) 
1
1  + 1

(1  A) 2

(1  A) 
1
1    1
 2
< 0 for any
0 < A < 1
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2.3 Holdup and foreign ownership of rms
So far, we assumed that rms investing in technology are always owned by local agents.
The fees charged by Downstream directly a¤ect incentives of rms in Upstream to invest in
technology. These rms know that there will be less demand for capital by the specialized
goods sectorA; because this sector will sell itsgood to the world market at lower price due to
the holdup problem. Therefore, the prots and the stock price of technology rms, is directly
a¤ected by Downstreams trade policy. Under capital mobility, this creates a potential
relationship between trade conditions and ownership of the rms. For this mechanism to
be interesting, we assume throughout this section that A is su¢ ciently high such that the
optimal fees are below the maximum fees Downstream can charge, i.e.  A < 
m
A .
While it is not crucial, we assume that investors from Downstream make takeover o¤ers
after the technology investments has been made, but before the optimal variable fees are
chosen by the government of Downstream.
In this setting, consumption per capita in Upstream is
~Cu = wu + ~P u   I (37)
and in Downstream is
~Cd = Cexo +

~u   ~P u

+ ~T dv , (38)
where ~P u is the price that the investors of Downstream pay for the technology rm in
Upstream. ~u2 is the prot of Upstream rm when owned by investors from Downstream
and ~T dv is the fee income in such case. We also expressed that consumption in Downstream
county that arises from other unrelated sources as Cexo (see also footnote 9).
The optimal fees that maximize consumption in Downstream then solve
~ A = arg max
~A

~T dv + ~
u
2

, where ~T dv is given by (35) for A = ~A: (39)
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If the technology rm in Upstream is owned by local investors, then from (10), (29) and
denition (20) the prots in this rm are u =   A (1   A)
1
1  , where  A is given by (36).
If it is owned by investors from Downstream, the prots are ~u2 =   A (1  ~A)
1
1  .
We can guess and verify that the optimal fees in the latter case are lower, ~ A < 

A. If
this holds, then the prots are higher, if the rm is owned by investors from Downstream,
i.e. ~u2 > 
u
2 . Technology producers in Upstream are willing to sell their rm for a price that
is at least u2 . Investors from Downstream are willing to buy the rm at most ~
u
2 . From here
the equilibrium equity price must be between these two prices, i.e. ~P u = ~
u
2 + (1  ) u2 ,
where  2 [0; 1] measures the intensity of competition between the potential investors from
Downstream.
Proposition 7 If investors from Downstream own the rm in Upstream, then the there is
a unique solution for optimal fees ~ A, such that
~ A < 

A:
Proof. See Appendix B.5.
Downstream government takes the business interests of its residents into account which
lowers the fees. From (33) and (34), it increases the volume of imports and exports between
Upstream and the rest of the world. It also increases both the likelihood of technology
investments and consumption in Upstream.
Proposition 8 Investment in technology pays o¤ in Upstream if
I < ~Iu = Iu +   A' (40)
and the consumption there is
~Cuv = C
u +   A'+   A'; (41)
22
where ' 

(1  ~ A)
1
1    (1   A)
1
1 

> 0 and ~Iu and Cu are dened in (31) and (32):
Proof. See Appendix B.6.
Lemma 8 shows that Upstream always benets from foreign ownership of itstechnology
rm. First, lower fees imply higher wages for local consumers. Furthermore, if Downstream
investors compete ( > 0), then consumers in Upstream also benet from selling their rms
for a higher value than otherwise. In such a case, also the investments in technology are more
likely as the threshold for the protable investments is higher (see (40)).This is an example of
a situation, where the reason why investments are more likely under foreign ownership is not
the standard reason that foreign owners bring knowledge, but it is purely due to interaction
between identity of the investor and trade policy - government in Downstream optimally
charges lower fees to benet itsagents business interests (and its residentsconsumption).
While consumers in Downstream receive lower revenue from the fees, the returns they
receive from owning the rm in Upstream can compensate for this. The crucial parameters
that determines whether consumers in Downstream benet or lose from owning rms in
Upstream is the bargaining power of takeover investors in Downstream, .
Lemma 9 There exists a threshold  (; ) < 1 such that the consumers in Downstream are
better o¤ due to ownership of rms in Upstream.
Proof. See Appendix B.7.
Figure 3 plots the threshold value of bargaining power,  (; ), that guarantees gains
for consumers in Downstream. While the relationship is non-monotonic, the likelihood of
gains tends to be higher if the A-good is more valuable for the nal goods sector, i.e.  is
high. Also, the threshold  (; ) is always positive 13 and there is a price for which selling
the technology producing rms to Downstream investors benets both countries.
While Downstream may lose due to its rms investing in Upstream, it can use additional
policy instruments to avoid this. For example, it can impose a tax on the prots its investors
13As  (; ) is determined only by  2 (0; 1) and  2 (0; 1) ;Figure 2 exhaust the possible outcomes (it
considers all values in the range from 0:01 to 0:99 for both parameters).
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Figure 2: The threshold for the bargaining power (; ) that guarantees consumption gains
for the downstream country.
earned from abroad and distribute it as a lump sum transfer to consumers, i.e. it could impose
a tax ~u2 where  2 (0; 1). In this case, the price of rms in Upstream must be between
u2 and ~
u
2 . Setting the tax    (; ), would guarantee that investors in Downstream do
not buy these rms "too expensively".
3 Implications of the model and trade patterns.
The model suggests that while trade increases income and the probability of investments
in technology, a country that faces a holdup problem is poorer and less likely to invest in
technology and to trade. If such country trades, then also the trade volume is smaller.
An immediate example of countries that are likely to face a holdup problem are landlocked
countries.
In the empirical part we will focus on the bilateral import data. Recall the equations
(25) and (33) that describe the imports between two countries that do not and do face a
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holdup problem respectively. Taking logs, we obtain that
ln (Y uF   uF ) = (42)8><>: ln

(1  )F (1 ) 21   1  A

if there is no holdup
ln

(1  )F (1 ) 21   1  A

+

1
1  +

1 

ln (1  A) if there is holdup
To bring these prediction to data we also need to include exogenous transport costs
which depend on distance. The di¤erence between transport costs and fees due to holdup is
that the latter are policy variables and should not a¤ect trade between countries that trade
directly (e.g. neighbors or both not landlocked). It would be straightforward to augment
the model with physical trading costs (e.g., iceberg costs) that proportionally reduce the
imports. A general relationship suggested by the model is that log imports are determined
by three types of variables terms
ln (imports) = country_pair_characteristics+ transport_cost+ holdup_cost (43)
Based on this, we test three implications of the model.
The e¤ect of the potential for holdup on trade
The above implies the following testable relationship for imports to country i from country
j (potentially through country k).
ln(imp)i;j;t = E [Xi;j;t + ~T;t + HUij] , (44)
where Xi;jt represents country characteristics of trading partners and ~T;t.represent trans-
portation and other trading costs. HUij nally is a dummy that takes the value 1 when
trade between countries i and j is subject to a potential holdup problem.
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HUij =
8><>: 0 if no transit country needed for i to trade with j1 if trade between i and j has to pass a transit country
For example, for a landlocked country HUij is 1 for all trading partners except trade with
its neighbors. Potential fees due to holdup would be present if a country trades through
another territory and based on our model (see (42)) we expect  < 0:
Do trade agreements reduce the holdup problem?
To examine if trade agreements with transit countries alleviate a potential holdup problem
we estimate
ln(imp)i;j;t = E [Xi;j;t + ~T;t + HUij + HUij  TAijkt] , (45)
where TAijkt is 1 if there is a trade agreement between country i and its transit country
and/or there is a trade agreement between country j and its transit country. Based on the
model we expect  < 0 and  > 0. We use membership of both the trading country and the
transit country in WTO or if they have a free trade area to dene TAijkt:. We also look at
Europe, that has a history of trade agreements between the member countries of European
Community and EFTA. Within this group we expect the holdup problem may be smaller or
absent.
Does foreign ownership reduce the holdup problem?
As argued in Section 2.3, foreign ownership of assets in Upstream is expected to reduce
the holdup fees. We therefore estimate
ln(imp)i;j;t = E [Xi;j;t + ~T;t + iHUi + jHUj + F;jHUj  FDI_liabj + jFDI_liabj] ,
(46)
where HUi is 1 if the importer i faces a holdup problem in its trade with j and HUj is the
corresponding dummy for the exporter j: Foreign direct investment liabilities by j are given
by FDI_liabj and it would be consistent with the model if j < 0 and F;j > 0:
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3.1 Data
To examine the predictions of the model we examine an unbalanced panel of the value of im-
ports of 152 countries measured at 5 year intervals between 1950 and 2000. The import data
are from IMFs direction of trade statistics and expressed in constant 1982-83 US dollars.
Our baseline regression is a standard gravity regression with Xi;j;t including for importer i
and exporter j at time t: time dependent importer and exporter xed e¤ects, bilateral dis-
tance, number of islands in trading relation, as well as dummies capturing common language,
common colonizer, former colonial relation, current colonial relation, currency union mem-
bership, free trade agreement, if imports to industrial country i from country j are covered
by the generalized system of preferences and one/both in WTO. The variables above are
from Subramanian and Wei (2007), who in turn build on Rose (2004). In some specications
we use foreign direct investment liabilities as an explanatory variable, these are from Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
We follow Subramanian and Wei (2007) and use time dependent exporter and importer
xed e¤ects in our main specication. As stressed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004)
bilateral trade volume depends not only on bilateral trade costs, but also on the trade costs
vis-à-vis all other trading partners. As shown in Feenstra (2004) exporter and importer xed
e¤ects can be used to control for the impact of these relative barriers. Any country specic
variable that does not vary across trading partners (such as aggregate productivity, number
of potential transit countries, quality of institutions or a dummy for landlocked status) will
be collinear with the xed e¤ect (see also equations (42) and (43)). Thus, country xed
e¤ects will capture the e¤ect of being landlocked on imports. The holdup dummy will be
identied by that for a landlocked country trade with its neighbors will not be subject to a
holdup problem. In robustness checks, in Table 3, we also estimate gravity equations without
these xed e¤ects using products of GDPs and GDPs per capita as additional explanatory
variables, as in the model, we can show that the country pair variables are proportional to
the nal good output]. The main new feature of the data is how distance is measured, as
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explained in the following.
3.1.1 Measuring distance.
We use distances between main cities in our main specication (using the classication of
main cities from CEPII (Mayer and Zignago (2006)) We measure distances between adjacent
countries by great circle distance ("as the crow ies"). For other trading relations we add
distances from the main cities to their closest main ports (data from www.ndaport.com) and
thereto add distance between ports (data from www.portworld.com). We use this measure
of distance as shipping by sea is the dominant mode of trade for non-adjacent countries
(Hummels (2007). Using dots to denote main cities and triangles to denote ports Figure 2
illustrates the distance measure between Country B and three other countries.
Figure 2: Illustration of measurement of distances.
Our use of distances via ports set us apart from other articles in the gravity literature
that have typically relied on great circle distances between countries. However, as we are
particularly interested in the holdup problem, and trade patterns of landlocked countries,
using great circle distance is associated with a potential measurement error. To all trading
partners, apart from neighbors, the distance of a landlocked country to trading partners
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Bilateral distances between coastal countries or countries that share a land border (holdup=0).
Sea+land,
main cities
Great circle,
main cities
Great circle,
midpoints
Sea+land, main cities 1.000
Great circle, main cities 0.874 1.000
Great circle, midpoints 0.858 0.989 1.000
Bilateral distances where there is at least 1 transit country (holdup=1).
Sea+land,
main cities
Great circle,
main cities
Great circle,
midpoints
Sea+land, main cities 1.000
Great circle, main cities 0.805 1.000
Great circle, midpoints 0.789 0.992 1.000
The table reports correlations between distances. Main cities as dened as in CEPII-data, (www.cepii.fr). Sea+land via
closest port (great circle distance is used for countries sharing a land border) and great circle distances between
midpoints as in Rose (2004) and Subramanian and Wei (2007).
Table 1: Correlations between di¤erent measures of distance.
is greater than that of its transit country - something we would not capture with great
circle distances.14 We use Figure 3 to illustrate the implication of this for distance and
trade of landlocked countries.15 Consider trade between landlocked country LL and country
B. Trade between these countries will want to go the shortest way overland and thus pass
via country A and be subject to a potential holdup problem. Compare to trade between
country A and country B on the other hand - using great circle distances will assign a shorter
bilateral distance between LL and B than between A and B. Consider a case where there
was no holdup problem and where actual distances travelled by goods decrease trade: We
would then erroneously conclude that trade between country LL and B was lower because
of a holdup problem when mismeasurement of distance would be the culprit. The distance
measure that we use allows for distance to have a more depressing e¤ect on trade when it is
overland and in our regression we include the share of distance that is overland as a regressor.
14Depending on what point in a country one uses to measure distances to and from this need to always
hold. For instance the capital of a landlocked country may be closer to the sea than the capital of its coastal
neighbor if the coastal countrys capital is far enough inland.
15Black dots denote main cities and shaded dots ports. Thin dotted lines show distance on land and fat
dotted lines show distance by sea.
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In Table 1 we report the correlation between bilateral distances measured between main
cities via the closest port, great circle distances between main cities and great circle distances
between midpoints of countries. As seen, the correlation between distances via ports and the
other distance measures is considerably lower (in all cases less than 0.9) than the correlation
between the two great circle measures (0.99). The correlation between the distance via
ports and great circle distance is lower if the trading relation is subject to a holdup problem:
falling from around 0.86 to around 0.816 This is an indication that the mismeasurement issue
discussed above may a¤ect the interpretation of the holdup dummy and we therefore use sea
and land distances as our main distance measure.
3.2 Results from regressions
In Table 2 we report the results from estimating eq (44). We rst examine a baseline
regression and compare di¤erent measures of distance. Column 1 reports results from a
standard gravity model using great circle distance between country midpoints. We use
a slightly di¤erent set of covariates than Subramanian and Wei (for instance the holdup
dummy and the number of islands in the trading relation) - nevertheless our baseline results
are very similar to theirs, for instance their coe¢ cient on distance is -1.259 (Table 6, column
1) compared to ours of -1.226. Column 2 uses great circle distances between main cities and
column 3 reports the regression with distance measured as distance via closest ports. Our
main interest is on the coe¢ cient on the holdup dummy and we now focus our discussion on
this coe¢ cient across the specications. Using the estimate in column (3) the coe¢ cient on
holdup indicates that imports of a country from a partner are some 66 percent (exp(0.512)-1)
lower if their bilateral trade is subject to a holdup problem. Di¤erences between regressions
in the magnitude of the holdup dummy are minor and thus the lower trade of a landlocked
country associated with our holdup dummy is not driven by mismeasurement of distance.
16Using a t-test and Fischers r to z transformation we can reject in each case that the correlations between
sea+land distance and great circle distances are the same for the trading relations subject to holdup and
those that are not.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable ln(imp) ln(imp) ln(imp) ln(imp) ln(imp) ln(imp)
Distance Gr. circle, Gr. circle, Sea+Land, Sea+Land, Sea+Land, Sea+Land,
measure mid points main city main city main city main city main city
Ln(distance) -1.226*** -1.160*** -1.154*** -1.375*** -0.952*** -0.643***
(0.0233) (0.0242) (0.0340) (0.0401) (0.104) (0.0528)
Share of 0.00754 -0.449 0.672 -0.112
land in dist. (0.403) (0.418) (0.674) (0.593)
Holdup -0.494*** -0.585*** -0.512*** -0.594*** -0.518*** 0.0650
(0.0995) (0.0953) (0.104) (0.110) (0.155) (0.103)
Land border 0.0465 0.123 -0.313** -0.253 0.538** -0.649***
(0.109) (0.112) (0.135) (0.164) (0.244) (0.236)
Sample Full Full Full 1990-2000 Africa Europe
Time var FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 71614 71614 71614 30435 15426 21748
Root MSE 1.656 1.659 1.666 1.761 1.942 1.123
Adj. R2 0.736 0.735 0.732 0.747 0.648 0.870
Notes: All regressions include time varying exporter and importer xed e¤ects. In addition all regressions include
a constant and controls for common language, common colonizer, former colonial relation, current colonial relation,
currency union membership, number of islands in trading relation, free trade agreement, trade covered by
generalized system of preferences, one/both in WTO. Standard errors clustered at country pair.
"***" signicant at 1 percent, "**" at 5 percent and "*" at 10 percent
Table 2: Bilateral trade in a gravity framework, 1950-2000.
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Nevertheless, the distance over sea and land is the one that matches our model the closest
and we use this distance measure in the following analysis.
Conceivably, holdup may have been a problem in the earlier parts of the period but
increasing accession to the GATT/WTO and the more liberal trading order may have muted
the holdup concerns. In column 4 we therefore examine the period 1990 and after - the
coe¢ cient on holdup is still signicant and of similar magnitude. The rst prediction from
the model is thus supported and it is not only a historical problem. Many of the poorest
landlocked countries are located in Africa and arguably institutional arrangements to protect
from holdup issues are weaker there than elsewhere. In column (5) we therefore examine
trade ows where the exporter is an African country, the coe¢ cient is similar as when we
estimate on the whole sample. On the other hand one may argue that the potential for
holdup is much less severe in Europe, where in particular the European Community and
later the European Union should imply an important restriction on the possibility of holdup
by transit countries. Indeed when we only examine European exporters the point estimate
on the holdup dummy is close to zero and not signicant.
The coe¢ cient on the share of land in distance is typically not signicant in Table 2. This
lack of signicance surprised us - note though that for most trading relations this share is low
and the exporter and importer xed e¤ects will be picking up much of the variation in the
share of land in distance. As in the specications of Subramanian and Wei (2007) the border
coe¢ cient is not signicant in columns (1) and (2). The coe¢ cient on sharing a land border is
signicantly negative when we use the sea and land distance measure for the full sample and
for European exports. This may be partly reecting that we measure distance between land
neighbors by great circle rather than via ports - which will assign a lower distance between
land neighbors than between otherwise equidistant trading partners. Given this, and that
we control for a host of variables that are frequently correlated across neighbors (such as
common language) the negative e¤ect of a land border is less surprising. Given the wealth
of controls in addition to time varying xed e¤ects for each exporter and importer it is also
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clear that multicollinearity could produce somewhat unstable results across specications.
We note however that the coe¢ cient of interest - the holdup dummy - is remarkably stable
across specications.
In Table 3 we rst explore if trade agreements with transit countries and foreign direct
investment can neutralize the holdup problem. Using time-varying exporter and importer
xed e¤ects would leave no variation for FDI liabilities and little for trade agreements with
the transit country to explain. As in Rose (2004), we therefore replace time varying xed ef-
fects with time e¤ects and the products of GDPs and GDPs per capita of the importing and
exporting countries in columns (1)-(5). Column (1) reports our baseline regression estimated
this way. As seen in column (1) the main coe¢ cient of interest is still negative and signicant
with a point estimate of -0.309. Column (2) reports the results from an estimation of eq.
(45). The point estimate on the interaction between the holdup dummy and free trade agree-
ments with transit counties is positive - which would suggest that trade agreements alleviate
the holdup problem. However the point estimate is low and not statistically signicant. In
column (3) we only examine the period after 1990 but the point estimate is still low and not
signicant.17 There is thus little indication that trade agreements with transit countries are
e¤ective in solving the holdup problem. To understand this result note that many of the
African landlocked countries, and their transit countries, became members of GATT already
in 1963. Many other landlocked countries are late joiners to WTO/GATT (Bolivia (1990),
Paraguay (1994), Mongolia (1997), Nepal (2004), Laos (2013)). With the weak institutions
that plague many African countries it perhaps not surprising that trade agreements have
not been an e¤ective remedy against fears of ex post opportunistic behavior.
Our model predicts that ownership by the transit country is a way to solve the holdup
problem. It is di¢ cult to nd reliable data on bilateral foreign direct investment liabilities
for the landlocked countries that are our prime focus. In a richer setting ownership by
large foreign corporations would also work to limit the holdup problem and we therefore
17Note that the set of landlocked countries is expanded in the later years when the Soviet Union dissolves.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variable Ln(imp) Ln(imp) Ln(imp) Ln(imp) Ln(imp) Ln(imp) Ln(imp) Ln(imp)
Probit Heckman 100bin (HMY)
Ln(distance) -0.975*** -0.974*** -1.148*** -1.177*** -1.204*** -0.267*** -1.396*** -1.113***
(0.0280) (0.0280) (0.0339) (0.0353) (0.0350) (0.0143) (0.0406) (0.0415)
Share of 0.604* 0.602* 0.0334 -0.503 -0.484 -0.712*** -0.388 0.109
land in dist. (0.320) (0.320) (0.374) (0.384) (0.384) (0.140) (0.416) (0.394)
Holdup (HU) -0.309*** -0.321*** -0.403*** -0.0973*** -0.563*** -0.431***
(0.0428) (0.0457) (0.0524) (0.0292) (0.110) (0.100)
Land border 0.111 0.111 0.350** 0.213 0.172 -0.103 -0.139 -0.0238
(0.120) (0.120) (0.148) (0.157) (0.155) (0.0692) (0.164) (0.151)
HU*fta 0.0436 0.0543
(0.0512) (0.0599)
HU_imp -0.205*** -0.299***
(0.0513) (0.0552)
HU_exp -0.395*** -0.374***
(0.0549) (0.0549)
HU_exp 0.0128**
FDI/CAP (0.00620)
FDI/CAP 0.0351***
(0.00233)
Common 0.332*** 0.332*** 0.493*** 0.539*** 0.543*** 0.118***
language (0.0431) (0.0431) (0.0514) (0.0570) (0.0537) (0.0122)
Inverse 0.0246
Mills ratio (0.225)
Sample Full Full 1990-2000 1995-2000 1995-2000 1990-2000 1990-2000 1990-2000
Time var FE no no no no no yes yes yes
Obs. 69481 69481 28302 18347 18347 54098 29905 29905
Adj. R2 0.637 0.637 0.671 0.689 0.694 0.579 0.731 0.741
Pseudo R2
Root MSE 1.943 1.943 2.026 1.908 1.890 1.786 1.755
Notes: Columns (1-5) include year xed e¤ects product of GDPs and product of GDPs per capita. In addition,
all regressions include a constant and controls for common colonizer, former colonial relation, current colonial
relation, currency union membership, free trade agreement, generalized system of preferences, number of islands in
trading relation, one/both in WTO.Columns (6-8) include time varying exporter and importer xed e¤ects instead of time
e¤ects. Column (6) reports marginal e¤ects. Column (8) uses predicted probabilities from (6) sorted into bins following
Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008). Distance measure is sea+land between main cities in all specications. Standard
errors clustered at country pair. "***" signicant at 1, "**" signicant at 5, and "*" signicant at 10 percent.
Table 3: Bilateral trade in a gravity framework. The role of trade policy, foreign direct
investment and the extensive margin.
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use FDI liabilities per capita for the exporter which we interact with the holdup dummy as
in (46). As a benchmark, column (4) examines the holdup dummies for the exporter and
importer separately for the set of trade relations where we have FDI per capita gures for the
exporter. Trading through a transit country is associated with lower trade for both importer
and exporter. In column (5) we introduce FDI per capita for the exporter and interact it
with the holdup dummy. Higher levels of FDI per capita is associated with more trade and
the coe¢ cient on the interaction with the holdup dummy indicates that the holdup problem
is attenuated by higher foreign direct investments - a nding consistent with the model.
Evaluated at the means for FDI per capita (8.03) the positive e¤ect of FDI per capita for
a landlocked country is to increase trade by 11 percent (exp(0.0128*8.03)-1). As always,
caution is advised in drawing conclusions from cross-country regressions. We nevertheless
note that the empirical evidence is consistent with our expectations for the holdup dummy
and the e¤ect of foreign ownership.
One concern, in line with our model, is that some trading relationships are not established
as a consequence of holdup problems. Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) bring the
prevalence of zero trade ows between possible trading partners to the fore. We therefore
expand the dataset to consider all possible trading relations. Including the zero trade ows
roughly doubles the data set and to limit the computational burden we focus on the period
1990 to 2000. In column (6) we report the marginal e¤ects from a probit regression where the
dependent variable is 1 if country i imports from country j in period t and 0 otherwise. The
explanatory variables are the same as in our baseline specication, including time varying
exporter and importer xed e¤ects. A change in the holdup dummy from 0 to 1 is associated
with a 10 percent lower probability of two countries trading in the specication in column
(6). A higher share of land in distance is associated with a lower probability that two
countries trade. Going from the 1st (0 landshare) to the 99th percentile (a landshare of
0.42) is associated with a 30 percent lower probability of a positive trade ow (-0.71*0.42).
We are interested in using the predicted probabilities in second stage regressions and we
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therefore want to include some variable that a¤ects the probability of trade, but not the
volume, once we have controlled for the probability. Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008)
nd that common language is an attractive candidate for such a variable and we follow their
lead in this. Column (7) presents the second stage of the Heckman estimation technique for
correcting for sample selection bias. It is the baseline regression, excluding common language
but including the Mills ratio which is calculated using the rst stage probit results in column
(6). The relevant comparison is with the baseline regression, not correcting for sample
selection, that we report in column (4) of Table 2. As in Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein
(2008) the coe¢ cients on the coe¢ cients of interest are little a¤ected by the sample selection
adjustment - indeed the coe¢ cient on the inverse Mills ratio is not signicant. Helpman,
Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) show how sorting the predicted probabilities from a rst stage
probit estimation (column 6) into equal sized bins and including indicator variables for these
bins is a exible way of controlling for the probability of observing a trading relation. As do
they, we nd that this way of controlling for the probability of observing an import relation
results in a fall in the coe¢ cients measuring trade frictions. For our purposes we note that
the holdup dummy, even though lower, is still highly signicant and in the same range as in
our 1990-2000 benchmark in Table 2, column (4).
In sum, we nd that having trade go through a transit country is associated with a large
depressing e¤ect on trade which, depending on specication, ranges between roughly 50
( exp (0:431) 1 from column 8 in Table 3) to 80 percent ( exp (0:599) 1 from column 4
in Table 2) in specications where we include importer and exporter xed e¤ects. This e¤ect
is not a result of a potential under-reporting of distance for landlocked countries as we use a
newmeasure of distance that arguably better captures the relevant distances involved in trade
of landlocked countries. The exception to the negative and signicant impact of our holdup
dummy is European exports - our preferred interpretation is that institutional arrangements
in Europe have succeeded in solving the holdup problem (on average - exceptions can clearly
be found as illustrated by severe controversies in 2008-2009 regarding the conditions under
36
which Ukraine is willing to let Russian gas reach nal customers in western and central
Europe). Trade agreements and WTO membership of transit countries elsewhere appear
not to have been e¤ective remedies against the holdup problem but the data are consistent
with the notion that higher FDI liabilities are associated with less of a holdup problem.
4 Concluding remarks
The trade of a landlocked country must pass a transit country to reach world markets. The
transit country is thus given an opportunity to dictate the terms by which the landlocked
country trades - in our model this makes the landlocked country poorer than it would be
under free trade. Furthermore, the trade volume and gains from technology investments are
smaller if a country is subject to a holdup problem. Foreseeing this we are less likely to
see technology investments in the landlocked country. As long as there is a lack of models
and rigorous discussion about these issues it makes them less likely to be incorporated into
international policy e¤orts to improve the situation in landlocked countries. For example,
in a 2003 conference organized by the United Nations a set of measures were agreed on (the
Almaty declaration) to better the situation for landlocked countries. Most of the suggestions
focused on trade facilitation and better infrastructure - holdup type problems were not given
a prominent role. By focusing on the potential for holdup, rather than high shipping costs
per se, our model points to the importance of arrangements to generate commitment to
secure transit. Internationally supervised "transport corridors" may for instance be one way
of making it more certain that a landlocked country which adjusts its industrial structure to
benet from international trade also gets to reap the gains of that investment.18
A brief look at world history points to an important role for the type of concerns that
we examine. Indeed, mercantilist economic thought that long dominated Europe was pre-
occupied with issues of (bargaining) strength. That coastal nations such as the UK, with
18For a thorough overview of the current status and history of legal rules regarding the transit rights of
landlocked countries see Uprety (2006).
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unhindered access to the developing overseas markets, were among the rst to adopt more
liberal trade policies is clearly in line with the model (see for instance Irwin (1996)). The em-
pirical evidence that we present is consistent with the idea that these concerns are not only
of historical importance. We have attempted to make the model as simple and transparent
as possible and many extensions are possible that may add more realism. In some cases, such
as with Switzerland, geography and history may also have endowed the landlocked country
with some countervailing bargaining power by control over important overland routes. Fur-
thermore, a landlocked country may have several potential ways to access world markets.
In the current model all bargaining power is given to Downstream. An alternative route to
world markets would act as an outside option for Upstream - holdup concerns would still be
relevant but the rents that Downstream could extract would be lower. The better outside
options that a landlocked country has, the less severe will the holdup problems be. A realis-
tic model would include important frictions, such as the possibility of collusion between two
downstream powers and infrastructure investment. Nevertheless, the main mechanisms ana-
lyzed would remain valid in a more general setting as long as the monopolistic or oligopolistic
power of transit countries (or ports) can not be fully eliminated.
Finally, the empirical analysis is done at an aggregated level, only examines some im-
plications of the theory and many renements are possible. A key prediction of the model
is that landlocked countries are less likely to export products that require a sunk cost of
investment. In exploratory work using data from 2000 we compared exports across coastal
and landlocked countries.We found that, outside Europe, landlocked countries export a lower
share of commodities that are more likely to require high up-front investments, such as prod-
ucts requiring specialized suppliers, large scale or science-based inputs. Also, as suggested,
by our model the share of di¤erentiated products in exports is lower for landlocked countries
outside Europe.19 For more recent times one can also examine the degree of specialization
19Trade data for 2000 (at 4-digit level) from NBER/UN as reported in Feenstra et al (2005). The classication of 4-digit
products to di¤erent types of commodities follows OECD (1994). For the share of exports that are di¤erentiated we use the
Rauch (liberal) classication.
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in goods that are relatively economical to transport by air. Rather than pursue this fur-
ther in this paper we note that the perhaps cleanest way to understand the relative roles of
holdup and transport costs would be to compare the production structure of inland regions
of coastal countries to neighboring regions in landlocked countries. This, and the qualitative
and quantitative e¤ects in a more elaborate setting, is left for future research.
A Proofs in the theoretical part
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The rst order condition of (3) gives that the wage in sector J solves wJ = (1  ) p
i
J
i
J
LiliJ
and the demand curve for the capital good is pix;J = p
i
J

liJL
iJi
xiJ
1 
. We then obtain that
@pix;J
@xiJ
=   (1  ) p
i
x;J
xiJ
. The rst order conditions of (4) are pix;J + x
i
J
@pix;J
@xiJ
  1 = 0 for
J 2 fA;Fg. As standard, we obtain constant price pix;J = 1= and xiJ = liJLiJ i
2
1  (piJ)
1
1  .
Using this in (2) and (4) gives (9) and (10). For wage, we use the above and (9) and note
that consumers optimally allocate their labor for the sector that pays the highest wage.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
In autarky, both countries must be incompletely specialized, i.e., wiA = w
i
F . From (11),
we then obtain that it must hold that (piA)
1
1  Ai = (piF )
1
1  F . Using (13) and the fact
that Aw = 1 and Ac is given by (1) then gives (15) and (16). Using (16), (10) and la-
bor market clearing lcA + l
c
F = 1;we nd that if the country c does not invest in technol-
ogy, then prots are c (1; F ) = (1  ) 21 F (1 ) 11  ; and if it invests then c (1; F ) =
(1  ) 21 F (1 ) 11  A. Condition (17) then follows from (5). We use (15), (16), (11),
(10) in (8) to nd the consumption (18) and (19).
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A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Because lcA = 1 and prices are given by (22), we obtain from (10) that it the country c
does not invest in technology then prots are c (1; F ) = (1  ) 21 F (1 ) 11  and if
it invests then c
 
A;F

= (1  ) 21 F (1 ) 11  A and condition (23) follows from (5).
Equation (24) follows then from (22), (11), (10) and (8). For import note that cF = 0 and
current account (21) implies that the imported quantity is
 
Y cF   FF

= Y cF =
pA
pF
(cA   Y cA)
and pFY cF + pAY
c
A = pA
c
A. From (12), we know that it must hold that pFY
c
F + pAY
c
A =
1
1 Y
c
FpF . Therefore, pFY
i
F = (1  ) pAcA. Using the (22) and (9), we obtain that imports
are (Y cF   cF ) = Y cF = (1  ) pApF cA = (1  )
2
1  

1 F 1  A
A.4 Proof that the rest of the world is incompletely specialized.
Here we verify that the world remains incompletely specialized, and produces both A-good
and F-good if the labor force in the rest of the world is large enough. Suppose that there
is a nite number N countries that invest in developing a comparative in producing A good
identical to country c is Section ??? and fully specialize in A-good, i.e., lcA = 1 and (9) it the
follows that all these countries produce
cA = 
2
1  (pA)

1  A and cF = 0. (47)
The worldwide market clearing condition then implies that
Y wA +N  Y cA = wA +N  cA and Y wF +N  Y cF = wF :
In the case of free trade, from (12) it holds that pAY iA =

1 pFY
i
F for any i. Adding these up
for all countries, it must hold that pA (Y wA +N  Y cA) = 1 pF (Y wF +N  Y cF ) and using the
worldwide market clearing condition, pA
pF
= 
1 
wF
wA+N cA . From (9) and (47), we then obtain
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that
pA
pF
=

1  
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1 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2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2
1 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Because from (11), incomplete specialization in the rest of the world must imply equal
wages across sectors, we obtain that wwA = w
w
F () (pA)
1
1  = (pF )
1
1  F . Hence

pA
pF
 1
1 
=
F = 
1 
LwlwFF
LwlwA+N
A
() (1  )  LwlwA +N A = LwlwF . As lwF = 1   lwA, this implies that
lwA =    (1 )N
A
Lw
. Clearly lwA < 1 and l
w
A  0 if Lw  (1 ) N A and large enough labor force
in the rest of the world guarantees incomplete specialization in the rest of the world. Also
it is worth noting that we considered N countries specialized in A in the case of free trade.
In the presence of any trade restrictions, even less restrictive condition for the rest of the
worlds incomplete specialization is needed.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 7
It must hold that ~ A 2 [0; 1]. Using (20), (??), and ~u2 =   A (1  ~ A)
1
1  in (39), the rst
order condition can be written as
LHS (~ A)  1  ~ A =

  
1  
1  
1 +
1  
1   (1  ~

A)
1 
 RHS (~ A) (48)
The slopes of RHS (~ A) and LHS (~

A) as both negative as
@LHS(~A)
@~A
=  1 < 1 and
@LHS(~A)
@~A
=  

 
1 
1 
(1  )

1 + 1 
1  (1  ~ A)
 
< 0. A su¢ cient condition for a
unique solution in such a case is that lim
~A!0
LHS (~ A) > lim
~A!0
RHS (~ A) and lim
~A!1
LHS (~ A) <
lim
~A!1
RHS (~ A). This can be conrmed to hold. First, lim
~A!0
LHS (~ A) = 1 and
lim
~A!0
RHS (~ A) =

 
1 
1  
1 + 1 
1 
1 
=

(2  )
1 
1 
< 1, because 2      2 <
1   () 0 < (1  )2, thus lim
~A!0
LHS (~ A) > lim
~A!0
RHS (~ A) : Second, lim
~A!1
LHS (~ A) = 0
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and lim
~A!1
RHS (~ A) =

 
1 
1 
> 0. Therefore, there is a unique solution.
If rms in Upstream are owned by the local investors there, then from (36) LHS ( A) =
1    A and RHS ( A) =

 
1 
1 
. Given that lim
~A!1
RHS ( A) = RHS (~

A), then 

A > ~

A
if
@LHS(~A)
@~A
<
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A)
@A
, which holds because
@LHS(~A)
@~A
< 0 and
@LHS(A)
@A
= 0. This proves
the proposition.
A.6 Proof of Lemma 8
The investment in technology in Upstream pays o¤ if u1 + ~P
u
 > I. Using then 
u
1 =  ,
~P u = ~
u
2 + (1  )u2 =   A (1  ~ A)
1
1  + (1  )  A (1   A)
1
1  , and that in the case
of ownership by local investors in Upstream, the investment pays o¤ if u1 + 
u
2 =   +
  A (1   A)
1
1  = Iv > I, proves that (40) holds. Using (11), ~P u and (??), consumption in
Upstream with Downstream investors is ~Cuv =  +  A (1  ~ A)
1
1  + +  A (1  ~ A)
1
1  +
(1  )  A (1   A)
1
1    I. With local investors, it is Cuv =   +   A (1   A)
1
1  +   +
  A (1   A)
1
1   I. Combining these, we obtain (41). From Lemma 7, it is straightforward
that (1  ~ A)
1
1    (1   A)
1
1  > 0:
A.7 Proof of Lemma 9
Given that the takeover investments do not a¤ect the production decisions in Downstream,
~Cdv  Cdv if ~u2   ~P u + ~T dv  T dv , where ~T dv is the fee revenue (35) in the case of A = ~ A
and T dv is the fee revenue in the case of A = 

A. Given that ~
u
2   ~P u = (1  ) (~u2   u2 ),
Downstream benets from the ownership of rms in Upstream if    = 1   T dv   ~T dv
~u2 u2 . As
 A maximizes the fee revenue, it is clear that T
d
v > ~T
d
v . Therefore, it must hold that  < 1.
Using (35), ~u2 , 
u
2 and the expressions for the optimal fees from (36) and (48), it is clear that
 (; ) depends only on the parameters  and . The threshold ,  (; ), for any values of
 2 (0; 1) and  2 (0; 1) is presented on Figure 2.
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B Data Sources
The main data are from Subramanian and Wei (2007) and are downloadable at
http://www.nber.org/~wei/data/subramanian&wei2003/sw_aggregate.zip. The dependent
variable is value of bilateral imports of 152 countries measured at 5 year intervals between
1950 and 2000, Subramanian and Wei collect these from the IMFs direction of trade statis-
tics.. The explanatory variables build on Rose (2004). This is the data source for the number
of islands in trading relation, as well as dummies capturing common language, common col-
onizer, former colonial relation, current colonial relation, currency union membership, free
trade agreement, if imports to industrial country i from country j are covered by the general-
ized system of preferences and one/both in WTO. Imports are in US 1982-83 dollars. In some
specications we use foreign direct investment liabilities as an explanatory variable, these are
from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). The main di¤erence from Subramian and Wei (2007)
is distance. As our measure of main cities we use data from CEPII (Mayer and Zignago
(2006)) which is also our source of the great circle distance measure between these main
cities. These are downloadable from http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm.
Distance to the closest port is from www.ndaport.com and distances between ports are
from www.portworld.com. The set of countries in the CEPII study is not the same as in
Subramanian and Wei. The list of countries is the following
Not Landlocked:
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Bahamas, The Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bar-
bados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bermuda, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon,
Canada, Chile, China,P.R.: Mainland, China,P.R.: Hong Kong, Colombia, Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Côte dIvoire, Denmark, Djibouti,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Fiji, Fin-
land, France, Gabon, The Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, I.R. of Iran, Iraq, Ire-
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land, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kiribati, Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Liberia,
Libya, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova,
Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway,
Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar,
Russia, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovenia, Soma-
lia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Syrian
Arab Republic, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine,
United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Rep. Bol. Venezuela,
Vietnam, Republic of Yemen.
Landlocked:
Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Rep., Chad,
Czech Republic, Ethiopia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao Peoples Dem. Rep,
FYR Macedonia, Malawi, Mali, Mongolia, Nepal, Niger, Paraguay, Rwanda, Slovak Repub-
lic, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Countries in Subramanian & Wei (2007) but not in our main regressions:
Antigua and Barbuda, Bhutan, Botswana, Cape Verde, Comoros, Dominica, Grenada, Lesotho,
Luxembourg, Maldives, Namibia, Réunion, Solomon Islands, St. Lucia, St. Vincent &
Grens., Swaziland, São Tomé & Príncipe, Tonga, Vanuatu, SFR Yugoslavia.
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